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I. INTRODUCTION
A common misperception is that law and the pursuit of justice
hinge solely on the substantive prohibitions and allowances that
our edicts provide. However, the judiciary often determines the
fate of legal claims by relying on more mundane considerations.
Indeed, the nuances of legal procedure are as important as sub-
stantive considerations in assuring that a client ultimately prevails.
This article addresses only one aspect of the procedural maze:
how to commence a state action in federal court that complies with
statute of limitation requirements when filing a state claim pursu-
ant to diversityjurisdiction or a federal question claim coupled with
state pendent claims. Part II describes the federal rules regarding
commencement of claims in federal court. Part III outlines the
Eighth Circuit's laws on commencement of claims, as one example
of how federal and state rules can diverge. Part IV discusses the
applicability of state statute of limitation and commencement rules
to state claims filed in federal court. Part V addresses the problems
practitioners face in view of different state and federal standards
regarding the commencement of claims, focusing on Eighth Cir-
cuit decisions. Finally, Part VI contains several suggestions regard-
ing how state and federal procedural inconsistencies can be recon-
ciled.
II. FEDERAL RULES--FILE TO BE SAFE
In federal court, a civil action is commenced by filing a com-
plaint with the applicable court.' Once the claim is filed, the plain-
tiff has the luxury of waiting 120 days before service of process is
2required. Take for example a claim alleging unlawful private em-
ployment practices under federal law.3 The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over the claim
for a minimum of 180 days.4 If the Commission takes no action,
1. See FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
2. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 4(c)(1), 4(m). The time for service can be extended
"for an appropriate period" if the plaintiff "shows good cause for the failure." FED.
R. Crv. P. 4(m).
3. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3 (1994); see also Whitmore v. O'Connor
Management, Inc., 156 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 1998) (interpreting the limitation bar
for claims of unlawful employment practices).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a)-(f); see also Local 179, United Textile Workers
of Am., AFL-CIO v. Federal Paper Stock Co., 461 F.2d 849, 851 (8th Cir. 1972)
(stating that federal employment discrimination charges must first be filed with
[Vol. 25
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does not enter into a conciliation agreement with the employer, or
dismisses the claim during its period of exclusive jurisdiction, the
aggrieved party could request and receive a right-to-sue letter.5
Once the aggrieved party receives a right-to-sue letter, he or she has
to commence any claim within ninety days.6 To ensure compliance
with federal commencement rules and avoid any time-bar prob-
lems, the aggrieved party will only have to file his or her claim
within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue letter.7 The plaintiff
can delay serving the defendant until sometime shortly after the
ninety-day commencement requirement expires.8
III. EIGHTH CIRCUIT RULES
A. Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota Rules--Serve To Be Safe
Civil actions commence in federal court upon a filing by the
plaintiff.9 However, state procedural rules do not necessarily mir-
ror federal rules. 10 For instance, in Minnesota, a civil action is
commenced by serving process upon the defendant. 1 A good exam-
the EEOC and plaintiff must receive right-to-sue letter from the EEOC before pro-
ceeding with a private suit); Rorie v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 151 F.3d 757, 761
(8th Cir. 1998) (construing the limitation period for federal claims of unlawful
employment practices).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f); see also Kent v. Missouri Dep't of Elementary
and Secondary Educ., 792 F. Supp. 59, 62 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (stating that a right-to-
sue letter is a condition precedent to bringing an employment discrimination suit
in federal court), remanded, 989 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1993) (remanding after Kent
received a right-to-sue letter and had exhausted all administrative remedies).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1); see also Kane v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs.,
955 F. Supp. 1117, 1133-35 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (holding that the 90-day requirement
for filing suit is subject to equitable tolling).
7. See FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
8. Service could be delayed for 120 days, assuming the claim commenced on
time by filing within the applicable statute of limitation. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 4(m);
see also Lujano v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 30 F.3d 1032, 1034-35 (8th Cir. 1994)
(stating that plaintiff must serve defendant within 120 days of filing the complaint
unless good cause exists for nonservice).
9. See FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
10. Compare FED. R. CIv. P. 3 with MINN. R. Crv. P. 3.01, NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-
217 (1995), N.D. R. Crv. P. 3, S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 15-2-30 (Smith 1984).
11. See MINN. R. Crv. P. 3.01 (emphasis added). Minnesota Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 3.01 specifically reads:
A civil action is commenced against each defendant: (a) when the sum-
mons is served upon that defendant, or (b) at the date of acknowledge-
ment of service if service is made by mail, or (c) when the summons is de-
livered to the sheriff in the county where the defendant resides for
1999]
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ple is a claim alleging unfair discriminatory employment practices
under Minnesota law. When the Minnesota State Commission
Against Discrimination chooses not to pursue a discrimination
charge and notifies an allegedly aggrieved individual, that individ-
ual has forty-five days to commence a civil suit from the date he or
she receives notice of the Commission's decision. 3 To avoid time-
bar problems under Minnesota rules, the plaintiff will have to file
suit and serve process on the defendant within the forty-five-day pe-
riod to ensure compliance with state commencement require-
ments. 14 Unlike the federal rules, filing alone would not suffice to
commence a claim under Minnesota law.'
Like the Minnesota rule, the North Dakota rule also requires
service of the summons to initiate a civil action.16 Thus, a plaintiff
can avoid time-bar problems only by filing suit and serving the de-
fendant. 17 For example, in a legal malpractice action under North
Dakota law, the two-year statute of limitation begins to run when
the plaintiff "knows, or with reasonable diligence should know, of
the injury, its cause, and the defendant's possible negligence."" To
comply with the North Dakota rule, a plaintiff in North Dakota
must file a petition with the court and serve process on the defen-
dant. 9
Similarly, South Dakota rules require the service of the sum-
mons upon the defendant to commence an action. 20 The key dif-
service; but such delivery shall be ineffectual unless within 60 days there-
after the summons is actually served on that defendant or the first publi-
cation thereof is made.
Id.
12. SeeMINN. STAT. § 363.03(1) (1998).
13. See MIN. STAT. § 363.14(1).
14. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 3.01.
15. Compare FED. R. Crv. P. 3, with MINN. R. Crv. P. 3.01.
16. See MINN. R Civ. P. 3.01; N.D. R. Crv. P. 3. The North Dakota rule states:
"A civil action is commenced by the service of a summons." N.D. R. Civ. P. 3. See
also Coman v. Williams, 50 N.W.2d 494, 497 (N.D. 1951) (stating that an action is
not commenced upon the mere filing of a complaint).
17. See N.D. R. Crv. P. 3.
18. See Duncklee v. Wills, 542 N.W.2d 739, 742 (N.D. 1996) (reversing sum-
mary judgment because a plaintiff's knowledge ordinarily poses a genuine issue of
material fact).
19. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 3, with N.D. R. Civ. P. 3 (requiring both filing and
service for commencement of action).
20. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-2-30 (Smith 1984). The rule specifically
states, "An action is commenced as to each defendant when the summons is served
on him, or on a codefendant who is a joint contractor or otherwise united in in-
[Vol. 25
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ference in South Dakota is that an attempt to perfect service will
usually suffice so long as it occurs within sixty days of actual serv-
ice.2 For example, a plaintiff suing for negligence under South
Dakota law must commence an action within three years of the date
of the injury. 2 Although a timely action may be commenced under
the federal rule by simply filing a complaint within the three-year
statute of limitation, the action would not be commenced in a
timely manner under South Dakota rules unless the plaintiff places
the summons in the sheriffs hands within the limitation period
21and publishes or serves the summons within sixty days thereafter.
To comply with the state rules in South Dakota, a plaintiff should
be certain to file a complaint, and either (1) serve the defendant
with the summons within the statute of limitation, or (2) deliver
the summons to the sheriff within the statute of limitation and pub-
lish the summons or serve the defendant within sixty days of fil-
ing.
24
B. Arkansas, Nebraska, Iowa, and Missouri Rules-File To Be Safe, and
Immediately Serve Thereafter
In some Eighth Circuit states, filing a complaint is sufficient to
25commence a civil action for statute of limitation purposes. Like
terest with him." Id.
21. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-2-31. This rule, which should be read in con-
junction with § 15-2-30, reads:
An attempt to commence an action is deemed equivalent to the com-
mencement thereof when the summons is delivered, with the intent that
it shall be actually served, to the sheriff or other officer of the county in
which the defendants or one of them, usually or last resided; or if a cor-
poration be defendant, to the sheriff or other officer of the county in
which such corporation was established by law, or where its general busi-
ness was transacted, or where it kept an office for the transaction of busi-
ness. Such an attempt must be followed by the first publication of the
summons, or the service thereof, within sixty days.
Id. The requirement in section 15-2-31 mandating publication or service within 60
days is absolute. See id.; see also Fisher v. Iowa Mold Tooling Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 155,
156 (8th Cir. 1982) (reversing trial court's denial of motion for dismissal of claim
for failure to perfect actual service within the South Dakota statute's time re-
quirement).
22. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 15-2-14; see also Fisher, 690 F.2d at 156.
23. SeeS.D. CODIIED LAWS §§ 15-2-30, 15-2-31; see also Fischer, 690 F.2d at 156.
24. Compare FED. R. Crv. P. 3, with S.D. CODIRED LAWS §§ 15-2-30, 15-2-31.
25. See ARK. R. Civ. P. 3; NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-217 (1995); IowA. R. Civ. P. 48;
Mo. R. Crv. P. 53.01.
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the federal system, however, these states require subsequent service
to maintain the action. For example, in Arkansas, civil actions are
commenced upon the filing of a complaint with the clerk of the
proper court. However, Arkansas rules require that one complete
service of process within sixty days of the filing of the complaint un-
less the court grants an extension. Under Arkansas law, if a plain-
tiff alleges negligence, the complainant must commence an action
within three years of the injury. To tread safely within the guide-
lines of Arkansas state requirements, a plaintiff must only file a
complaint with the court within the statute of limitation. But, apart
from statute of limitation concerns, the plaintiff must perfect serv-
ice within sixty days from the date of filing to maintain the action.
29
One can also commence a civil action in Nebraska simply by
filing a petition with the court.0 However, the action will be dis-
missed without prejudice if service is not perfected within six
months of the filing.3' For example, in a medical malpractice suit
under the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act, a plaintiff must
commence an action within two years "after the alleged act or
omission in rendering or failing to render professional services
providing the basis for such action." Accordingly, a plaintiff in
26. See ARP R. Civ. P. 3. Rule 3 provides: "A civil action is commenced by fil-
ing a complaint with the clerk of the proper court who shall note thereon the date
and precise time of filing." Id. This rule superceded a previous statute that re-
quired not only the filing of a complaint, but also the placing of the complaint
and summons in the hands of the sheriff of the proper county. See id. and ARK. R.
Civ. P. 3 reporter's note, at 1.
27. SeeARK. R. CIv. P. 3 and ARK. R. Civ. P. 3 reporter's notes, at 2.
28. SeeARK. CoDEANN. § 16-56-105 (Michie 1987).
29. Compare FED R. Crv. P. 4, with Aix. R. Civ. P. 3. See Brown v. Rinehart, 105
F.R.D. 532, 533 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (dismissing the action for failure to adhere to Ar-
kansas' 60-day service requirement); but see Walden v. Tulsair Beechcraft, Inc., 96
F.R.D. 34 (W.D. Ark. 1982) (holding that plaintiff did not need to meet proce-
dural requirements of the Arkansas rule requiring service since federal procedure
applied).
30. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-217 (1995) ("An action is commenced on the
date the petition is filed with the court. The action shall stand dismissed without
prejudice as to any defendant not served within six months from the date the peti-
tion was filed.").
31. See Kocsis v. Harrison, 543 N.W.2d 164, 168 (Neb. 1996) (applying Ne-
braska Revised Statutes section § 25-217 in medical malpractice action).
32. NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2828 (1993). The statute provides:
[A] ny action to recover damages based on alleged malpractice or profes-
sional negligence or upon alleged breach of warranty in rendering or
failing to render professional services shall be commenced within two
years next after the alleged act or omission in rendering or failing to
[Vol. 25
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Nebraska must only file a petition with the court within the two-year
statute of limitation to satisfy commencement requirements for
statute of limitation purposes. However, the plaintiff must still
serve the defendant within six months of filing to maintain the ac-
tion.3
Like Arkansas and Nebraska, Iowa rules require only the filing
of a petition with the court to commence a civil action. The stat-
ute of limitation is tolled upon the filing of a petition.35 However, if
the petition, original notice, and directions for service are not
promptly delivered for service on the defendant, the mere filing of
the petition may not protect the claim from dismissal on proce-
dural grounds.' 6 A court must dismiss the action if the plaintiff
does not serve the defendant within ninety days of filing the peti-
tion unless the plaintiff shows good cause for failing to serve.3 ' For
example, in a personal injury action under Iowa law, a party must
render professional services providing the basis for such action.
Id.; accord Kocsis, 543 N.W.2d at 168.
33. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 3, with NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-217 (1995).
34. See IOWA R. Civ. P. 48. The rule specifically reads, "For all purposes, a civil
action is commenced by filing a petition with the court. The date of filing shall
determine whether an action has been commenced within the time allowed by
statutes for limitation of actions, even though the limitation may inhere in the
statute creating the remedy." Id.
35. See id.; see also Henry v. Shober, 566 N.W.2d 190, 192 (Iowa 1997) (apply-
ing Iowa commencement rules in personal injury action).
36. See IOWAR. Civ. P. 49(f). Rule 49(f) provides:
If service of the original notice is not made upon the defendant, respon-
dent, or other party to be served within 90 days after filing the petition,
the court, upon motion or its own initiative after notice to the party filing
the petition, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defen-
dant, respondent, or other party to be served or direct an alternate time
or manner of service. If the party filing the papers shows good cause for
the failure of service, the court shall extend the time for service for an
appropriate period.
Id.; see also Shober, 566 N.W.2d at 192.
37. See IOWA R. Civ. P. 49(f). For claims filed prior to the rule's effective date
of January 24, 1998, the Iowa Supreme Court required dismissal of the action if
there was an unjustified or abusive delay in completing service. See Mokhtarian v.
GTE Midwest, Inc. 578 N.W.2d 666, 668 (Iowa 1998) (affirming trial court's dis-
missal of claim where plaintiff failed to show adequate justification for seven-
month delay in serving defendant); Shober, 566 N.W.2d at 192-93 (holding that
169-day delay in service was presumptively abusive and that plaintiffs failed to
prove the delay was justified).
1999]
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commence the action within the two-year statute of limitation.38
Thus, to avoid time-bar problems, a plaintiff must fie the case
within the statute of limitation. s9 Yet even if a plaintiff files a peti-
tion with the court within that two-year period, failure to serve the
defendant within ninety days without showing good-cause will re-
sult in dismissal. 4° To avoid any problem, a plaintiff should file the
petition within the applicable statute of limitation and promptly de-
liver service of process on the defendant.4'
Similarly, under Missouri rules, filing a petition with the court
commences a civil action.42 Service of process has nothing to do
with tolling the applicable statute of limitation.43 For example, in a
38. See id. at 191.
39. See IOWA R. Civ. P. 48.
40. See IowA R. CIv. P. 49(f); see also Mokhtarian, 578 N.W.2d at 668 ("Iowa
Rule of Civil Procedure 49(f) now imposes a ninety-day deadline for service of an
original notice after filing of a petition.").
41. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 3, with IowAR. Civ. P. 48, 49(f).
42. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 53.01. The rule specifically commands that "[a] civil
action is commenced by filing a petition with the court." Id.; accord Ostermueller
v. Potter, 868 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Mo. 1993) (holding that "[a] civil action is com-
menced by filing a petition with the court" despite contradictory statutory lan-
guage).
43. See Mo. R. CIv. P. 53.01; Ostermueller, 868 S.W.2d at 11. At one time in
Missouri, courts imposed a service requirement to commence a civil action. See
Tri-City Constr. v. A.C. Kirkwood & Assoc., 738 S.W.2d 925, 928-29 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987) (citing U.S. Laminating Corp. v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 716
S.W.2d 847, 849 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) "and cases there cited") implied overruling rec-
ognized by Corwin ex rel. Wolfe v. Coleman, 879 S.W.2d. 602, 604-07 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994); accord, e.g., Birdsell v. Holiday Inns, 852 F.2d 1078, 1081 (8th Cir. 1988). In
doing so, Missouri courts abandoned the plain language of the applicable rule.
For example, the Missouri Court of Appeals in Tri-City addressed commencement
requirements under Missouri law. See 738 S.W.2d at 928-29. Missouri Rule of Civil
Procedure 53.01 specifically mandates that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing
a petition with the court." Mo. R. Civ. P. 53.01. In Ti-City, however, the court in-
sisted that Rule 53.01 be read "in conjunction with the next following rule, Rule
54.01." 738 S.W.2d at 928. But Rule 54.01 contained no mention of how to com-
mence a civil action for statute of limitation purposes, and simply required service
of process with "due diligence" as another procedural requirement. See Mo. R.
Civ. P. 54.01. Nevertheless, in the court's strained view, filing a lawsuit did not
commence a lawsuit for statute of limitation purposes despite the wording of Rule
53.01; instead, filing "conditionally halted" the statute of limitation, but the action
would not be commenced for statute of limitation purposes until the plaintiff
served the defendant with due diligence. Tri-City, 738 S.W.2d at 928 (citing Votaw
v. Schmittgens, 538 S.W.2d 884, 886 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)). In any case, the court
in Tni-City reached its commencement conclusion by relying on U.S. Laminating
Corp. v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., which the Missouri Supreme Court overruled
in Ostermueller v. Potter. Compare Ti-City, 738 S.W.2d at 929 (citing U.S. Laminating,
738 S.W.2d at 849) with Ostermueller, 868 S.W.2d at 111 (citing U.S. Laminating
without jump cite).
[Vol. 25
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negligence action, a plaintiff seeking damages in a Missouri court
must commence an action by filing a petition with the court within
the five-year statute of limitation." However, an action may still be
dismissed if a plaintiff fails to complete service of process with "due
diligence."45 Thus to avoid any problems in Missouri, a plaintiff
must file a claim within the statute of limitations, but still must
complete service of process using "due diligence" to avoid dismissal
on other grounds."
IV. APPLICABILITY OF STATE RULES TO STATE CLAIMS IN FEDERAL
COURT-SWIMMING IN THE WAKE OF ERIE
Our country was founded on a federalist structure. This fed-
eralist structure creates inevitable tension between two binding be-
liefs: (1) the integrity of state home-rule, and (2) the need for fed-
eral uniformity and consensus. 47 The interplay of state and federal
judicial procedure is not immune from such conflicts, and the Su-
preme Court continually struggles to clarify the import of conflict-
48ing parameters in the state and federal legal systems. Such prob-
44. See OstermueUer, 868 S.W.2d at 110-11 (five-year statute of limitation applies
to negligence action and filing a petition is commencement for statute of limita-
tion purposes); Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.120 (1986).
45. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 54.01. Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 54.01 provides
in relevant part:
Upon the filing of a pleading requiring service of process, the clerk shall
forthwith issue the required summons or other process and, unless oth-
erwise provided, deliver it for service to the sheriff or other person spe-
cifically appointed to serve it. If requested in writing by the party whose
pleading requires service of process, the clerk shall deliver the summons
or other process to such party who shall then be responsible for promptly
serving it with a copy of the pleading.
Id.
46. Compare FED. R. CIv. P. 3, 4(j) with Mo. R. Civ. P. 53.01, 54.01.
47. See In re Air Crash at Detroit Metro. Airport, 776 F. Supp. 316, 319 (E.D.
Mich. 1991) (discussing the choice-of-law tensions that arise between state and
federal law when a federal court sits in diversity); see also Michael H. Hoffheimer,
Mississippi Conflict of Laws, 67 Miss. L.J. 175 n.397 (1997) ("Tension between the
state court's effort to elaborate a coherent body of choice-of-law law rooted in ac-
commodating conflicting state policies and the federal courts' penchant for spe-
cific and predictable rules seems to reflect an underlying tension between de-
mands for coherence and determinacy that may not be reconcilable.") (citing
William A. Edmundson, The Antinomy of Coherence and Determinacy, 82 IOWA L. REV.
1, 1-20 (1996)).
48. See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751-52 (1980) (hold-
ing that when there is no federal rule directly on point, state service requirements
1999]
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lems are particularly acute in the diversity context, where state
claims are adjudicated in federal court because of the parties' differ-
ing state citizenship.4
In one of its earliest pronouncements on the subject, the Su-
preme Court faced a potential clash between state and federal judi-
cial doctrine in the diversity case of Swift v. Tyson.50 In Swift, the
Court considered whether to apply New York common law to a
51soured loan arrangement allegedly secured by negotiable paper.
The Court obliquely reasoned that federal common law should
prevail over nonstatutory and nonconstitutional state law in diver-
sity cases, with federal courts basing their opinions "not on the de-
cisions of the local tribunals, but [on] the general [federal] princi-
ples and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence. 5 1 Unfortunately,
the Swift decision led to a legacy of discrimination in favor of non-
citizens, prevention of uniformity in the administration of state law,
and forum shopping.
that are an integral part of the state statute of limitation should control in an ac-
tion based on state law which is filed in federal court under diversity jurisdiction);
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472-74 (1965) (holding that Rule 4(d)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not state law, governs service of process in a civil
action in which federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, and where
there is a "direct collision" between the federal and state law); Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 531-34 (1949) (holding that in diversity
actions, federal courts must follow state law requiring service of summons within
statute of limitation period rather than Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when the
cause of action is created by state law); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99,
108-12 (1945) (ruling that federal courts must follow state statute of limitations in
diversity actions); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that
state law, whether determined by the legislature or the court, shall be applied in
any case not governed by the U.S. Constitution or Acts of Congress), overruling
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
49. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994) (explaining diversity jurisdiction require-
ments); see, e.g., Fischer v. Iowa Mold Tooling Co., 690 F.2d 155, 158 (8th Cir.
1982) (dismissing claim for failure to perfect actual service within the South Da-
kota statute's time requirement); Walker, 592 F.2d at 1136 (dismissing claim in di-
versity action for failure to serve within the limits imposed by Oklahoma law);
Brown v. Rinehart, 105 F.R.D. 532, 533-34 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (holding that in diver-
sity action, complaint which was filed on last day of limitation period and not
served within 60 days of filing, was not timely commenced under Arkansas rule).
50. 41 U.S. 1 (1842); see also John B. Corr, Thoughts on the Vitality of Erie, 41
AM. U. L. REv. 1087 (1992) (analyzing Swift v. Tyson as foundation for Erie R?. Co.
v. Tompkins).
51. See Swift, 41 U.S. at 3-5.
52. Id. at 18.
53. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 745 (holding that a diversity case should follow
state law over Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "in determining when
an action is commenced for the purpose of tolling the state statute of limita-
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The Court took a breather for nearly one hundred years be-
fore revisiting the implications of Swift.54 In 1938, the Supreme
Court reviewed the seminal case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.5
Tompkins was walking on a commonly used beaten footpath that
56was parallel to a railway track in Pennsylvania. He was hit and in-
jured when an Erie Railroad freight train with an allegedly protrud-
ing door whizzed by him.57 Tompkins brought a federal court di-
versity negligence claim against the railroad in the company's state
of incorporation, New York . Pennsylvania common law explicitly
considered those who used pathways along railroads to be trespass-
ing, whereas New York common law was silent on the subject.59
Tompkins urged the Court to create a general federal common law
holding that those who used common footpaths adjacent to rail-
road tracks were rightfully on the premises as licensees. The rail-
road argued that the federal court should apply the law of Pennsyl-
vania, since Tompkins was a Pennsylvania resident and the accident
occurred in Hughestown, Pennsylvania. 6' The Court, clearly trou-
bled by the forum shopping and disadvantages stemming from
Swift, overturned its earlier pronunciation and forcefully declared
that outside of federal constitutional and statutory matters, "the law
to be applied in any [diversity] case is the law of the State. '6 2 Now
that the general rule was clarified, the Court could turn its atten-
tion to the detail work.
Seven years later, the Court had reason to review the logical
outgrowths of Erie in a statute of limitation context.63 Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York involved an action filed by non-accepting note-
tions"); see also Ann V. Crowley, Rule 4: Service by Mail May Cost You More Than a
Stamp, 61 IND. L.J. 217 (1986) (describing strict application of language of rule us-
ing service by mail).
54. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overruling Swift and
holding that state law applies in cases not governed by the U.S. Constitution or
acts of Congress); see also GeriJ. Yonover, A Kinder, Gentler Erie: Reining in the Use of
Certification, 47 ARK. L. REv. 305 (1994) (discussing the facts of Erie and current
applications by the courts).
55. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
56. See id. at 69.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 70.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 78.
63. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
64. Id.
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holders against a trustee for an alleged breach of fiduciary duties.65
The case was filed in a New York federal district court, but New
66York law would have time-barred the action. The Court reviewed
the issue of "whether, when no recovery could be had in a State
court because the action is barred by the statute of limitations, a
federal court [exercising diversity jurisdiction] in equity can take
cognizance of the suit .... ,,67 The Court held that in diversity ac-
tions federal courts should defer to state procedural limitations
that are "a matter of substance," or "significantly affect the result of
a litigation."'' According to the Court, federal courts exercising di-
versity jurisdiction should defer to state statutes of limitation in par-
ticular, because statutes of limitation impacted state-created rights
"vitally And not merely formally or negligibly."69 The Court then
applied the New York statute of limitation and barred the claim, ex-
tending the logic of Erie in declaring:
[T]he outcome of the litigation in the federal court
should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules de-
termine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried
in a State court.... [F]or the same transaction the acci-
dent of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court
instead of in a State court a block away should not lead to
a substantially different result.70
In a nutshell, the Court found that the New York statute of
limitation rule was an integral part of the state-law cause of action
and should therefore govern time-bar issues in a federal court di-
71versity action.
If the York case was somehow ambiguous regarding the appli-
cation of state statutes of limitation in diversity cases, the Court's
next attempt in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co. ap-
peared definitive.7 ' Ragan was decided only four years after Yor*,
65. See id. at 100-01.
66. See id. at 99.
67. Id. at 108-09.
68. Id. at 112.
69. Id. at 110.
70. Id. at 109.
71. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 745 (1980).
72. See Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949);
see generally Yonover, supra note 54 (pointing to continued viability of Ragan after
Swift).
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and revolved around an automobile accident and resulting tort ac-
tion.7" The plaintiffs in Ragan filed suit within two years of the ac-
cident in a federal district court in Kansas.74 However, Kansas law
did not deem an action commenced until process was served.75 Al-
though the plaintiffs filed the claim twenty-three months after the
accident, the defendant was not served for several additional
months; as a result, the defendant was not served within the twenty-
four month Kansas statute of limitation. The plaintiffs argued
simply that "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure determine the
manner in which an action is commenced in the federal courts."
77
The Court disagreed and barred the claim, finding that the
service requirement was a vital part of the state's statute of limita-
tion, and that the Court could not provide the cause of action with
"longer life in the federal court than it would have had in the state
court" without violating the prescripts of Erie and York, 78 The Court
in no uncertain terms rejected the argument that Rule 3 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governed the tolling of the appli-
cable state statute of limitation, in an action filed in federal court
pursuant to diversity jurisdiction. 79
Naturally, the Court could not resist the allure of complexity
and threw a monkey wrench into a gelling line of cases with the
1965 decision in Hanna v. Plumer.8° In Hanna, an automobile acci-
dent victim filed a personal injury suit in a federal district court in
Massachusetts against a Massachusetts citizen who died some time
after the accident.8' The plaintiff left copies of the summons and
complaint with the executor's wife at his residence in compliance
82with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 4 per-
mitted service by leaving a summons copy at a defendant's resi-
dence with an individual of suitable discretion, but Massachusetts
law required in-hand service to the executor or administrator of an
estate. The Court distinguished York and Ragan by noting that
73. See Ragan, 337 U.S. at 530.
74. See id. at 531.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 531, nn.1-4.
77. Id. at 533.
78. Id. at 533-34.
79. See id.
80. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); see generally Corr, supra note 50
(describing twin aims of Erie in Hanna v. Plumer).
81. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461.
82. See id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (1).
83. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461-62.
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"the difference between the two [state and federal] rules would be
of scant, if any, relevance to the choice of forum. Petitioner, in
choosing her forum, was not presented with a situation where applica-
tion of the state rule would wholly bar recovery .... ,,4 Thus, the
Court decided to apply the federal rule "[ al] though choice of the
federal or state rule will at this point have a marked effect upon the
outcome of the litigation .... ,85 Moreover, the Court explained
that Erie and later cases involved application of state rules in a di-
versity action where the applicable federal rule was not broad
enough to directly conflict.s6
In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan noted that the Court
barely mentioned or adequately distinguished the Ragan decision,
which in his view demanded the application of the Massachusetts
rule. s7 Harlan criticized the majority for "setting up the Federal
Rules as a body of law inviolate," but concurred in the result in part
because he felt that "the [Ragan] decision was wrong. ,8s Although
the harmony between Ragan and Hanna was ambiguous, the major-
ity opinion's analysis read at root that in event of a "direct colli-
sion," the applicable federal rule would control if passed in compli-
ance with the Rules Enabling Act and the Constitution. 9
The Erie line of cases as compounded by Hanna led to a circuit
split on the issue of whether state statute of limitation tolling re-
quirements directly conflicted with the applicable federal rule. In
order to resolve the issue, the Court granted certiorari in the case
of Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.9' In Walker, an Oklahoma carpenter
filed a state products liability claim in federal court against a for-
eign nail manufacturer, after the carpenter permanently injured
84. Id. at 469 (emphasis added).
85. Id.
86. See id. at 470.
87. See id. at 476 (Harlan,J., concurring).
88. Id. at 476-77 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,
446 U.S. 740, 749 n.8 (1980) (summarizing Justice Harlan's concurrence in
Hanna).
89. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472; see also Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(Supp. 1995) (granting the Supreme Court the power to prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure in the lower federal courts for the purpose of resolving
conflicts in procedural rights).
90. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 744 n.6 (outlining the disagreement in the lower
federal courts); see also Jack J. Rose, Erie RR and State Power to Control State Law:
Switching Tracks to New Certification of Questions of Law Procedures, 18 HoFSTRA L. REv.
421 (1989) (examining the conflict between federal and state courts as to the ap-
plication and utilization of certification procedures).
91. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 744.
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92his eye while pounding a nail into a concrete wall. The complaint
was filed just three days before the expiration of time allotted by
Oklahoma's applicable two year statute of limitation, and according
to Oklahoma law, the plaintiff had a sixty day grace period after fil-
ing to serve process on the defendant. 93 In Oklahoma, only service
of process commences an action for the purposes of tolling the
94state statute of limitation. When the plaintiff failed to serve proc-
ess within the two year and sixty day period, the federal district
court dismissed the complaint as barred by the Oklahoma statute of
limitation, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.95
On review, the Supreme Court began its analysis in Walker by
describing the case as "indistinguishable" from Ragan. The Court
clarified that Hanna did not overrule Ragan, and noted that unlike
Hanna there was no "direct collision" between the state and federal
rules in this case.97 The Court then commanded federal deference
to Oklahoma's "substantive decision":
Rule 3[of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] simply
states that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a com-
plaint with the court." There is no indication that the
Rule was intended to toll a state statute of limitations,
much less that it purported to displace state tolling rules
for purposes of state statutes of limitations. In our view, in
diversity actions Rule 3 governs the date from which vari-
ous timing requirements of the Federal Rules begin to
run, but does not affect state statutes of 
limitations.98-
92. See id. at 741.
93. See id. at 743.
94. See id. at 742-43.
95. See id. at 743-44; see also Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 452 F. Supp. 243 (D.
Okla. 1978), affd, 592 F.2d 1133 (10th Cir. 1979).
96. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 748. In fact, as noted by the Court "the predecessor
to the Oklahoma statute in this case was derived from the predecessor to the Kan-
sas statute in Ragan." Id. (citing Dr. Koch Vegetable Tea Co. v. Davis, 145 P. 337,
340 (1914)).
97. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 750-52.
98. Id. at 750-51 (citations and footnotes omitted). Walker explicitly declined
to address the applicability of state or federal statute of limitation tolling provi-
sions if the underlying cause of action is based on federal law. See id. at 751 n.11.
The Supreme Court eventually considered the issue in West v. Conrail:
When the underlying cause of action is based on state law, and federal ju-
risdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, state law not only provides
the appropriate period of limitations but also determines whether service
must be effected within that period. Respect for the State's substantive
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In the view of the Court, Rule 3 and the Oklahoma rule could
"exist side by side.., each controlling its own intended sphere of
coverage without conflict. The Court was adamant that the serv-
ice requirement was an "integral" part of Oklahoma's statute of
limitation, and that "Rule 3 does not replace such policy determi-
nations found in state law."' °° In short, the Court refused to sanc-
tion a situation where a state claim that would otherwise be barred
in state court would survive in the federal forum "solely because of
the fortuity that there is diversity of citizenship between the liti-
gants.
"101
There is an undeniable tension between Hanna and the Ragan
and Walker cases. Although the law governing when to apply con-
flicting state and federal procedural rules in federal court is tor-
tured, for the purposes of this article one thing is clear. Regardless
of the interplay between other federal and state rules, in diversity
cases, Walker, Ragan and York mandate the application of state stat-
utes of limitation, inclusive of state commencement requirements.
V. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM CONFLICTING FEDERAL AND STATE
STATUTE OF LIMITATION COMMENCEMENT REQUIREMENTS IN THE
EIGHTH CIRCUIT-SHARKS IN THE ERE TANK
As illustrated by the case law, problems arise when a state claim
is filed in federal court within the applicable statute of limitation,
but service is postponed. Even if a federal claim is filed within the
statute of limitation, any pendent or independent state claim may
decision that actual service is a component of the policies underlying the
statute of limitations requires that the service rule in a diversity suit "be
considered part and parcel of the statute of limitations." This require-
ment, naturally, does not apply to federal-question cases.
... Although we have not expressly so held before, we now hold that
when the underlying cause of action is based on federal law.., the ac-
tion is not barred if it has been "commenced" in compliance with Rule
3 ....
481 U.S. 35, 39 & n.4 (1987) (citations omitted) (quoting Walker, 446 U.S. at 752).
This language left unresolved the applicability of state statute of limitation and
commencement rules to pendent state claims in federal question cases. See infra
notes 104 and 136 and accompanying text.
99. Walker, 446 U.S. at 752.
100. Id.
101. Id.at753.
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still require service before the statute of limitation is satisfied. In
other words, depending on state commencement requirements,
the state claims are endangered if service, as well as filing, does not
occur within the applicable state statute of limitation.
The problem was recognized by the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure Advisory Committee as early as 1937. °2 Despite the Advi-
sory Committee's recognition of the problem, the federal rules
have no built in safeguards that harmonize conflicting federal and
state statute of limitation commencement requirements. 0 3  Al-
though the issue appears resolved by Ragan and Walker, practitio-
ners in the Eighth Circuit repeatedly stumble over the application
of state statute of limitation rules to state claims filed in federal
102. The 1937 adoption notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules read:
When a Federal or State statute of limitations is pleaded as a defense, a
question may arise under this rule whether the mere filing of the com-
plaint stops the running of the statute, or whether any further step is re-
quired, such as, service of the summons and complaint or their delivery
to the marshall for service. The answer to this question may depend on
whether it is competent for the Supreme Court, exercising the power to
make rules of procedure without affecting substantive rights, to vary the
operation of statutes of limitations.
FED. R. CIv. P. 3, advisory committee's note 4.
According to the Supreme Court, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee
.predicted the problem" that is the subject of this article, and may have expected
but did not intend that Rule 3 serve as a tolling provision for statute of limitation
purposes regarding state claims in diversity actions. See Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.10 (1980).
103. The Advisory Committee apparently thought that Rule 4 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure would adequately deal with the issue of conflicting state
and federal statute of limitation commencement requirements. The Advisory
Committee notes for Rule 3 read, "[t]he requirement of Rule 4(a) that the clerk
shall forthwith issue the summons and deliver it to the marshall for service will re-
duce the chances of such a question [regarding conflicts between state and federal
statute of limitations commencement requirements] arising." FED. R. Civ. P. 3,
advisory committee's note 4.
However, Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require
thq clerk to deliver the summons to the marshall for service after issuing the sum-
mons. In fact, the clerk is to "issue [the summons] to the plaintiff for service on
the defendant." FED. R. Crv. P. 4(b) (Supp. 1998). The rule elaborates, "plaintiff
is responsible for service of a summons and complaint within the time al-
lowed .... " Id. 4(c) (1). Only "[a]t the request of the plaintiff," will the court "di-
rect that service be effected by a United States marshall. ... " Id. 4(c) (2). Even
upon request by the plaintiff, the court has discretion in deciding whether a mar-
shall should be the one to serve the summons. Id. ("the court may direct") (em-
phasis added).
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104
court.
For example, Sieg v. Karnes'° involved the ramifications of an
automobile accident between residents of two different states.
0 6
The plaintiff filed suit in federal district court on the last day avail-
able under the applicable South Dakota statute of limitation, and
her attorney personally served the defendant on that same day.' °
However, under South Dakota law, the attorney's personal delivery
was not a valid method of serving a defendant.'°s Since South Da-
kota requires service for an action to be commenced, and the serv-
ice in this case was invalid, the court dismissed the claim as time-
barred by the statute of limitation. °9
104. This confusion occurs despite explicit warnings in the annotated federal
code. The general federal statute of limitation for civil actions is followed by prac-
tice commentary which cautions practitioners that "[t]he line of a limitations in-
quiry in a diversity case... is in any event a straight one" since "resort to state law
in a diversity case has been carried right down to a determination of the moment
that the action is deemed commenced .... 28 U.S.C.A. § 1658 (Practice Com-
mentary) (West 1994 & Supp. 1998) (citing Walker).
Similarly, the annotated federal rules take pains to put practitioners on
notice regarding the implications of Walker
As long as the complaint has been filed [in federal court] on or before
the last day - the assumption would run - the action is timely and the sum-
mons and complaint can be served at any time during the 120 days that
follow [pursuant to Rule 40) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure] .... The foregoing is true enough as a general principle when ju-
risdiction is based on a federal question, or any other ground of jurisdic-
tion except diversity of citizenship. When diversity is the jurisdictional basis
for the federal action, however, Rule 3 emphatically does not govern for purposes of
the statute of limitations. The rule applicable in a diversity case to determine
whether the statute of limitations has been satisfied is taken from the law of the
state in which the federal court happens to be sitting.
28 U.S.C.A. [FED. R. CIv. P.] 3 (Practice Commentary) (emphasis added). In fact,
the practice commentary in the annotated federal rules is followed by a large-font,
bold-faced caption that reads "WARNING TO PLAINTIFFS ABOUT RELYING ON
RULE 3 IN DIVERSITY CASES," followed by the succinct lecture "[f ] or those who
might not have read the foregoing Commentary but whose eye is caught by cap-
tions, we offer the above caption and this brief statement: read the foregoing
Commentary." Id.
105. 693 F.2d 803 (8th Cir. 1982).
106. See id.; see also Kent Sinclair, Service of Process: Rethinking the Theory and Pro-
cedure of Serving Process Under Federal Rule 4(c), 73 VA. L. REV. 1183 (1987) (discuss-
ing Sieg v. Karnes and federal service of process requirements).
107. See Sieg, 693 F.2d at 804.
108. See id. at 806.
109. See id. at 806-07; accord Chizmadia v. Smiley's Point Clinic, 726 F. Supp.
249, 252 (D. Minn. 1989) (addressing how in a diversity action, state law controls
when an action is commenced) (citing Sieg, 693 F.2d at 804-05).
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Similarly, the Eighth Circuit dismissed a state law claim based
on the allegedly negligent design and manufacturer of a hydraulic
crane in Fischer v. Iowa Mold Tooling Co." ° The injured plaintiff's
suit was filed in federal district court within three days of the time
allotted by South Dakota's applicable three-year statute of limita-
tion." However, the plaintiffs attorney followed local customary
practice and mailed the summons to a sheriff in the defendant's
home state of Iowa for service."' The sheriff apparently did not re-
ceive and serve the summons until eleven days later, or eight days
too late to satisfy South Dakota's commencement requirements for
statute of limitation purposes a13 The court dismissed the claim as
time-barred despite the "lamentable" facts, declaring "Walker v.
Armco Steel has laid to rest the notion that Rule 3 can ever be used
to toll a state statute of limitations in a diversity case arising under
state law."" 4
Based in part on the Walker reasoning, the federal court in
Brown v. Rinehart' dismissed a state negligence claim as time-
barred. n 6 In Brown, a plaintiff filed a claim relating to an automo-
bile accident on the last day of the period allotted by the applicable
Arkansas statute of limitation, pursuant to the federal court's diver-. .. .. . 117
sityjurisdiction. However, the defendant was not served for more
than five months after the filing date." s Since Arkansas required
service of process within sixty days of filing for commencement
purposes, the court dismissed the claim for failure to toll the state
limitation statute.11
Rogers v. Furlow"° is another example of an otherwise poten-
110. 690 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1982).
111. See id. at 156.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 157-58 (footnote omitted). In the process of relying on Walker, the
court overruled its 1973 decision in Prashar v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 480 F.2d
947 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 994 (1974), which held that compliance
with Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure constituted commencement of
an action for purposes of tolling the South Dakota statute of limitation. See Fischer
690 F.2d at 157; Prashar, 480 F.2d at 948. The court in Fischer commented that
Walker "must control," and that "the supposed distinction [between the state stat-
utes in Prashar and Walker] . .. is of no real moment." Fischer, 690 F.2d at 157.
115. 105 F.R.D. 532 (E.D. Ark. 1985).
116. Seeid. at 533-34.
117. Seeid. at533.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 533-34.
120. 729 F. Supp. 657 (D. Minn. 1989).
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tially valid claim being dismissed within the Eighth Circuit because
the plaintiff did not comply with state commencement require-
ments for statute of limitation purposes in a diversity context.121
The plaintiff in Rogers filed a state medical malpractice claim
against the Mayo Clinic and two doctors for their allegedly negli-
gent care in relation to a surgically implanted inflatable penile
prosthetic device. 12 2 Although the claim was filed with the federal
district court a few weeks before the applicable Minnesota statute
of limitation would have barred the action, service was delayed for
nearly two months.123 Judge Doty succinctly dismissed the case, or-
dering that "[i]n a diversity case Minnesota state law determines
when an action is commenced for statute of limitations pur-
poses.
" 24
Yet again, a court summarily dismissed a plaintiff's state negli-
gence claim as time-barred in Walker v. Thielen Motors, Inc. 25 The
plaintiff was a Tennessee resident who was injured in an accident in
Tennessee, but the defendants in the case were Minnesota resi-
dents. 26 The plaintiff filed her claim in federal district court in
Minnesota within the six-year statute of limitation applicable to
state personal injury actions. 27  However, defendants were not
served until six years and one day after the accident. The court
applied Minnesota's procedural rules and dismissed the claim as
time-barred, noting that "Walker [v. Armco Steel] clearly dismissed
Rule 3 as a 'controlling federal rule' in situations such as this
,,129
case ....
Practitioner confusion is particularly acute where a plaintiff
files a federal claim and pendent state claim together in federal
court. In Appletree Square 1, Limited Partnership v. WR. Grace &
Co.,13° a building owner brought federal RICO 3' and state law
121. See id. at 661.
122. See id. at 658.
123. See id. at 659 (explaining that service was delayed due in part to the Wis-
consin court's refusal to allow the new action, and in part to plaintiffs subsequent
failed attempt to bring his new claim in an Illinois court).
124. Id. at 661.
125. 916 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1990).
126. See id. at 450.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 451 (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750-51
(1980)).
130. 815 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Minn. 1993), affd, 29 F.3d 1283 (8th Cir. 1994).
131. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.
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products liability, nuisance, and breach of warranty claims against
W.R. Grace in federal district court in Minnesota. Sixteen years
earlier, W.R. Grace had supplied an asbestos-containing fireproof-
ing product which was sprayed on the building's structural steel
during construction.'" The building owner filed suit on June 29,
1990, within the applicable statute of limitation, but did not serve
process until July 3, 1990, a date that fell outside of the applicable
Minnesota statute of limitation by two days.'3 The court ruled that
the state law claims were all time-barred, since Minnesota law re-
quires service before an action is commenced for purposes of toll-
ing the applicable statute of limitation.' ' The court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that state claims, when coupled with federal
question claims, should be governed by the Federal Rules regard-
ing commencement for statute of limitation purposes:
[T]he presence of federal question jurisdiction as to
Count X does not command a different [time-bar] result
for the state law claims in Counts I through IX... the
source of the cause of action, whether state or federal law,
determines whether Fed.R.Civ.P. 3 will toll statutes of limi-
tations. Whatever the rule where a federal law cause of ac-
tion is pled, state commencement rules control where a
136state law cause of action is pled [in federal court] .
§§ 1961-68 (1994).
132. See Appletree, 815 F. Supp. at 1266.
133. See id. at 1269.
134. See id. at 1271.
135. See MINN. R. Crv. P. 3.01; Appletree, 815 F. Supp. at 1280.
136. Appletree, 815 F. Supp. at 1272 & n.9; accord Alholm v. American Steamship
Co., 144 F.3d 1172, 1176 (8th Cir. 1998) (ruling that state limitation and com-
mencement rules apply to pendent state malpractice claims in case where plaintiff
invoked federal jurisdiction because of claim brought under federal Jones Act, 46
U.S.C. § 688) (citing Anderson v. Unisys Corp., 47 F.3d 302, 309 (8th Cir. 1995)
(holding that the state procedural rule applies where both federal and state claims
are alleged)); Appletree Square I, Ltd. Partnership v. W.R. Grace & Co., 29 F.3d
1283, 1286 (8th Cir. 1994). Appletree and subsequent Eighth Circuit cases place in
doubt the continued veracity of Kyllo v. Farmers Cooperative Co., 723 F. Supp. 1332
(D. Minn. 1989). In Kyllo, the plaintiff was fired from her job and filed both fed-
eral and state age and gender discrimination suits in federal court. See id. at 1333.
The plaintiff had forty-five days to "bring" her state action. See id. at 1335 & n.4.
The plaintiff filed her claim on the forty-fifth day, but did not serve summons until
day forty-six. See id. at 1334. Still, Judge Diana E. Murphy allowed the state claim
to proceed, referencing Hanna but paying no mention of Ragan or the seminal
Walker case:
Jurisdiction is based here upon alleged violations of federal law, with
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Here then, state law claims that may or may not have had in-. 137
dependent worth were procedurally time-barred. A plaintiffs at-
torney failed to heed the warnings of Ragan and Walker and waited
a few days after filing the claim before serving the defendant, in
turn failing to comply with the applicable state statute of limita-
tion.138 Appletree extended the Walker doctrine to pendent state
claims in federal court, explicitly ruling that both pendent state
claims and state claims filed under diversity jurisdiction were sub-
ject to state statute of limitation and commencement require-
ments.' 39 The Eighth Circuit later affirmed Appletree.
14
0
Despite all the earlier precedent, practitioners in the Eighth
Circuit continued to ignore the Walker mandate that state law gov-
erns commencement and statute of limitation rules in diversity
141cases. The same year as the lower court's determination in Ap-
pletree, the Eighth Circuit affirmed two similar decisions. In Con-
cordia College Corp. v. WRtL Grace & Co., 4 3 a college sued W.R. Grace
for asbestos removal abatement costs pursuant to state law. 1" Grace
manufactured the asbestos-containing building materials used in
some of Concordia's college buildings.' 5 Concordia filed the suit
on June 29, 1990, but did not serve Grace until July 24, 1990.146
The applicable statute of limitation and accompanying revival stat-
pendent state claims. The action was filed and remains in federal
court .... An action is commenced in federal court by filing the com-
plaint with the court.... Plaintiff therefore timely brought her action by
filing her summons and complaint within 45 days.
Id. at 1335-36. In view of the Eighth Circuit's subsequent pronouncements, Kyllo is
undoubtedly bad precedent, although it was not appealed.
137. SeeAppletree, 815 F. Supp. at 1280.
138. See id. at 1271.
139. See id. at 1272.
140. Appletree Square I, Ltd. Partnership v. W.R. Grace & Co., 29 F.3d 1283,
1286 (8th Cir. 1994).
141. See, e.g., Concordia College Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 999 F.2d 326, 330
(8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the plaintiffs claims were time-barred under Minne-
sota law); Metropolitan Fed. Bank v. W.R. Grace & Co., 999 F.2d 1257, 1262 (8th
Cir. 1993) (affirming Concordia and similarly barring plaintiffs claims under Min-
nesota law).
142. See Concordia College Corp., 999 F.2d at 326; Metropolitan Fed. Bank, 999 F.2d
at 1257.
143. 999 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1993).
144. See id. at 328.
145. See id. at 328.
146. See id.
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ute required commencement of the action byJuly 1, 1990, as in Ap-
pletree. Finding the claims time-barred under the analysis out-
lined by the Supreme Court in Walker, the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the lower court's summary judgment in favor of Grace. 148
W.R. Grace again benefited from a plaintiff's failure to obey
the Walker and Ragan decisions in Metropolitan Federal Bank of Iowa v.
WR. Grace & Co.) 9 Metropolitan also involved a building owner su-
ing Grace to recover abatement costs relating to asbestos-
containing building materials. 5 0 The court referenced the Concor-
dia decision and affirmed the district court order dismissing the
claims, finding that the claims were filed before the applicable limi-
tation period but that service did not occur until after the applica-
ble statute of limitation expired. 5 ' The state claims in Metropolitan,
like those in Appletree and Concordia before it, were governed by
Minnesota's statute of limitation, which required service before an
action was legally commenced for purposes of tolling the limitation
period.
52
Finally, this vintage procedural error occurred again in the
1995 decision Anderson v. Unisys Corp.'53 Most of the previous
Eighth Circuit case law dealt exclusively with state claims in a fed-
eral court acting under diversity jurisdiction, but Appletree extended
the Walker doctrine to those state claims that were pendent in fed-
eral question cases.' Still, the plaintiffs mistake in Appletree was
repeated in Unisys. 55 Unisys laid off Anderson from the company's
software engineering division, and Anderson filed a series of state
and federal anti-discrimination complaints. 56 The district court
dismissed the pendent state claims as time-barred, since Anderson
filed his complaint just within the applicable Minnesota statute of
limitation but failed to serve Unisys for months thereafter. 57 The
147. See id. at 328; Appletree Square I, Ltd. Partnership v. W.R. Grace & Co.,
815 F. Supp. 1266, 1271 (D. Minn. 1993).
148. See Concordia College Corp., 999 F.2d at 328.
149. 999 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1993).
150. See id. at 1258.
151. See id. at 1261-62.
152. See id. at 1262; see also Concordia College Corp., 999 F.2d at 328; Appletree, 29
F.3d at 1273.
153. 47 F.3d 302 (8th Cir. 1995).
154. See Appletree, 29 F.3d at 1286.
155. See Unisys Corp., 47 F.3d at 304-05.
156. See id. at 304.
157. See id. at 302-03, 305.
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Eighth Circuit affirmed.
5 8
This egregious pattern of procedural errors continues, even in
pure diversity cases. In the unreported decision of Kramer v. To-
kos Medical Corp., a plaintiff's state law sexual harassment claim was
dismissed from a federal district court acting under diversity juris-
diction, because the plaintiff filed the claim properly but failed to
serve the defendant within the applicable Minnesota statute of limi-
tation. 16  Despite the relative clarity of Ragan, Walker and subse-
quent case law developments, yet another plaintiff's state law claim
was dismissed from federal court within the Eighth Circuit for fail-
ure to comply with state rules requiring service ofIfrocess to com-
mence an action for statute of limitation purposes.
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR SAFE SWIMMING
Again and again, plaintiffs in the Eighth Circuit see their state
law diversity claims or pendent state claims dismissed from federal
court for failure to comply with state statute of limitation and
commencement rules. How can practitioners avoid this problem?
The answer is simple. In diversity cases, the Supreme Court has de-
finitively demanded respect for state statute of limitation require-
ments. A plaintiff filing a state claim in federal court pursuant to
diversity jurisdiction must follow the applicable state proceduralS 162
rules regarding commencement and timeliness of claims.
Although the applicability of state commencement and statute
of limitation rules to pendent state claims in federal questions may
be undecided on the national level, the Eighth Circuit is clear that
pendent state claims will also be governed by state timeliness rules.
A plaintiff filing a federal question claim coupled with pendent
state claims must abide by the applicable state commencement and
statute of limitation rules, to ensure that the state claims are not
dismissed as time-barred. It may seem strange that federal causes
of action, normally governed by federal civil procedure rules, must
abide by default to more demanding state rules because of their
158. See id. at 309.
159. See Kramer v. Tokos Med. Corp., No. 3-93-346, slip op. at 6-7 (D. Minn.
Feb. 22, 1995).
160. See id. at 7.
161. See id.
162. See AP.R. CIv. P. 4; IowA. R. Civ. P. 48; MINN. R. Civ. P. 3.01; Mo. R, Crv.
P. 53.01; NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-217 (1995); N.D. R. Civ. P. 3; S.D. CODIFIED LAws §
15-2-30 (Smith 1984).
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coupling with pendent state claims in federal question cases. How-
ever, the only alternative is to file the federal and state claims sepa-
rately.
In view of the case law, these solutions seem obvious. How-
ever, some practitioners in the Eighth Circuit remain unfamiliar
with the Supreme Court's ruminations in Walker v. Armco Stee 63 and
subsequent expansions in federal case law. One other word of ad-
vice is applicable here. A consistent theme in the aforementioned
case law is that plaintiffs are filing claims at the last minute, albeit
true that the filing occurs within the applicable statute of limitation.
Because of the pure mechanics, service often occurs a few days or
weeks later than filing, and that lag becomes dispositive of claims
that may have been otherwise valid. Clearly, if the claims were filed
even a month earlier, there would have been enough time in many
of these cases to allow service within the applicable state statute of
limitation.
The world of litigation is competitive, aggressive and unforgiv-
ing. When swimming in rough waters, it is best to remember the
old adage that one is better safe than sorry.
163. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
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